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Abstract—Studies show that Deep Neural Network (DNN)-
based image classification models are vulnerable to maliciously
constructed adversarial examples. However, little effort has been
made to investigate how DNN-based image retrieval models are
affected by such attacks.
In this paper, we introduce Unsupervised Adversarial Attacks
with Generative Adversarial Networks (UAA-GAN) to attack
deep feature-based image retrieval systems. UAA-GAN is an
unsupervised learning model that requires only a small amount
of unlabeled data for training. Once trained, it produces query-
specific perturbations for query images to form adversarial
queries. The core idea is to ensure that the attached perturbation
is barely perceptible to human yet effective in pushing the query
away from its original position in the deep feature space.
UAA-GAN works with various application scenarios that are
based on deep features, including image retrieval, person Re-ID
and face search. Empirical results show that UAA-GAN cripples
retrieval performance without significant visual changes in the
query images. UAA-GAN generated adversarial examples are less
distinguishable because they tend to incorporate subtle perturba-
tions in textured or salient areas of the images, such as key body
parts of human, dominant structural patterns/textures or edges,
rather than in visually insignificant areas (e.g., background and
sky). Such tendency indicates that the model indeed learned how
to toy with both image retrieval systems and human eyes.
Index Terms—adversarial example, image retrieval, GAN,
unsupervised learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are a powerful feature rep-
resentation learning tool that achieves state-of-the-art per-
formance in content-based image retrieval (CBIR). In re-
cent years, deep features are quickly replacing conventional
image features that rely on handcrafted key-point detectors
and descriptors. DNN-based models generate a deep feature
descriptor for an image by aggregating the activations from
the top layers of a pre-trained deep neural network, and then
the similarity(or distance) between two images is determined
by the euclidean distance or cosine similarity of their fea-
ture vectors. Such methods have been observed to be able
to preserve more abstract and global semantic information
than those low-level key-point-based features. Inspired by the
excellent representation capability of DNN, many researchers
focus on improving the retrieval accuracy through learning a
discriminative feature representation. However, the robustness
and stability of DNN features in the retrieval task has been
largely overlooked. As shown in Figure 1, a DNNs-based
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image retrieval system is successfully fooled by a generated
adversarial query image, which is visually nearly identical
to the original copy yet has a very different deep feature
representation .
Fig. 1. An example of adversarial attack on deep feature-based image
retrieval systems. It is evident that although visual difference between the
adversarial example (top right and bottom left) and the original image (top
left and middle left) is very small, the adversarial query image can fool the
retrieval system to return visually dissimilar search results. Green borders of
the results mean correct query results and red borders mean otherwise.
It is known that DNNs-based classification systems are
vulnerable to adversarial examples: by adding some carefully
crafted, minor perturbations to an input image, the target DNN
is often mislead and predicts the image to a wrong class with
high confidence [1]. Adversarial examples are first introduced
in [1], the perturbations are generated by tweaking the input
for maximized classification error. Much attention has then
been drawn to the rivalry between adversarial attacks and
defenses. The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FSGM) [2] and its
iterative variation [3] generate adversarial examples through
gradient updates along the direction that maximizes the loss.
Optimization-based methods, such as C&W [4] , reformulate
adversarial attacks on image classification as an optimiza-
tion problem that generates more sophisticated adversarial
examples. Leveraging the idea from DeepFool [5], Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. [6] propose a method image-agnostic adversar-
ial perturbations, named Universal Adversarial Perturbations
(UAP), which makes natural images getting misclassified by
the target network.
More recently, researchers started to examine the effect of
adversarial examples on other tasks, such as object detection
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[7], semantic segmentation [7], [8], image caption [9] and face
recognition [10]. Despite the increasing research attention on
adversarial examples, image retrieval as a task has yet to be
studied thoroughly as a target for such attacks. In this work,
we demonstrate that deep feature-based Content Based Image
Retrieval (CBIR) systems and its derived applications: person
re-identification (ReID) and face search, are also prone to
adversarial attacks. That is, it is possible to tamper with an
image to make it almost visually identical to its original form
yet nearly impossible to be searched in an image retrieval
system. Attacking image retrieval system is significantly more
challenging than attacking classification models, due to two
main reasons.
First reason is, in image classification, the output of the
fully-connected layer and the softmax activation function are
very sensitive to minor changes around key points and areas on
the target object to be classified. Minor perturbations can sig-
nificantly reduce the activation of the pre-trained convolution
kernels that are supposed to function as local feature detectors.
Whereas on the image retrieval task, the image is searched
against a database on global features that went through many
layers of max-pooling or sum-pooling layers of convolutional
neural networks (CNNs), hence it is in general more invariant
and robust to minor local changes.
Then, class labels are normally available for training the
classifier, the adversarial example generation is hence easy to
formulate. By using the gradient information in the classi-
fication process, it is quite intuitive to generate adversarial
examples by pushing the input away across the decision
boundary. While for image retrieval, the goal is to push the
feature representation away from its original position and its
original neighbors in the feature space. This problem is more
difficult to formulate because it lacks of well defined labels
and gradient information.
We propose a novel Unsupervised Adversarial Attacks
method with GAN (UAA-GAN) that aims at fooling deep
feature-based image retrieval systems, by giving it three de-
sirable properties: Firstly, the generated adversarial example
should be distant from the original image and its original
neighbors; Secondly, the norm and placement of the pertur-
bation should be in such a way that the visual difference of
the adversarial example from the original image is not easily
identifiable. Thirdly, the adversarial examples should realistic-
looking and high perceptual quality.
Our main contributions are threefold:
• We proposed an efficient GAN-based attack framework
called UAA-GAN for generating photo realistic adver-
sarial examples with effective perturbations nearly im-
perceptibility to humans.
• UAA-GAN is entire unsupervised and requires only a
small amount of unlabeled images for training. Once
trained, it can generate perturbations according to each
query image.
• We evaluate UAA-GAN on three tasks: content-based
image retrieval, person re-identification and face search.
Empirical results show high effectiveness of UAA-GAN
in all tasks.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section III
describes the technical details of the proposed UAA-GAN
framework. Section IV reports comprehensive experimental
results and analysis. The relevant existing works are described
in Section II . Finally, we conclude our work in section V.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Adversarial Examples
The adversarial example method is proposed in [1], which
proves small and intentional perturbations can mislead ma-
chine learning models to make false predictions. After that,
many methods have been devised to construct adversarial
examples. Goodfellow et al. [2] proposed a simple fast gradient
sign method (FSGM), which only adds a small error multiplied
by the sign of the gradients to the input to form an adversarial
example. Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [3] is the iterative
version of FSGM, which produces better adversarial images
through applying gradient update and clipping repetitively.
AdvGAN [11] applies generative adversarial networks to
produce adversarial examples. Unlike methods that generate
different perturbations for each image, Universal Adversarial
Perturbations (UAP) [6] computes an image-agnostic and mi-
nor perturbations to fool deep networks. Recently, adversarial
attacks have been extended to many other applications. Xie et
al. [7] introduce a novel Dense Adversary Generation (DAG)
algorithm to fool the networks for semantic segmentation
and object detection. The Show-and-Fool method presented
in [9] suggests that neural image caption models can also be
vulnerable to attacks.
B. Deep Feature-based Image Retrieval
Image retrieval aims to search the image database for similar
images as the query. It has been widely used in many applica-
tions, such as image search engines or product search engines
such as that on eBay [12]. Latest DNN-based retrieval methods
represent images by aggregated deep features extracted from
pre-trained or fine-tuned CNN models. The similarity between
two images is directly measured by the euclidean distance
or cosine similarity of two image representations in the deep
feature space. The simplest deep global descriptors aggregate
compact features by sum-pooling (SPoC [13]) or max-pooling
(MAC [14]) the feature maps output by convolutional layers.
Regional Maximum Activation of Convolutions (R-MAC) [14]
extends the MAC by summing the MAC features of several
regions at multiple scales. There are methods that further
improve the performance of image retrieval by fine-tuning the
backbone networks (such as: VGG, ResNet) on task-related
datasets. NetVLAD [15], which adds a VLAD pooling layer
after convolutional layers, is trained in an end-to-end manner
by a weakly supervised ranking loss. The training data of
NetVLAD is collected from the Google Street View Time
Machine. Filip et al. proposed a trainable Generalized-Mean
(GeM) pooling layer in [16], and fine-tunes the network using
a dataset collected from Flickr through structure-from-motion
Fig. 2. The overall architecture of the UAA-GAN framework. The design goal of this framework is to attack a retrieval system built on a specific target feature
extraction network by generating an adversarial example with query-specific perturbation. By considering three different losses, we ensure three objectives
are achieved with the adversarial example. The GAN loss enforces that the adversarial example, changed by perturbation though, should look as natural as
possible; the metric loss is used to push the adversarial example aways from the original query’s feature in the deep feature space; the reconstruction loss
acts as a regularization to restrict the level of perturbation that is added to the original query image.
(SfM) 3D reconstruction algorithm. DELF [17] introduces
attention mechanism to the base networks to obtain discrimi-
native image representations.
Person ReID and face search are the two most essential
derived subproblems of image retrieval. They aim at searching
in the gallery for images containing the same person/face with
the query image. In recent years, most of the state-of-the-art
methods are based on DNNs. We choose the state-of-the-art
methods to evaluate the attack performance of UAA-GAN,
such as MGN [18] for ReID task and Sphereface [19] for face
search task.
C. Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are first proposed
by Goodfellow et al. [20], who formulate the GAN as a
two-player minimax game between two adversarial networks.
Radford et al. proposed Deep convolutional GANs (DCGANs)
[21], which introduced convolutional layers and convolutional-
transpose layers to GANs architecture. Conditional GANs
(cGANs) [22] extend the vanilla GANs with conditional set-
tings, and are able to control the generated samples with a con-
dition via embedding the condition vector with the noise vector
input to the generator. GAN-based methods have achieved
excellent performance on many image-to-image translation
tasks, like image super resolution [23], image deblurring [24],
image synthesis [25], etc. Despite the tremendous successes,
GANs still suffer from the challenges of model collapse and
instability in training. Many studies have been proposed to
address these problems by improving the optimization objec-
tives. WGANs [26] improved the vanilla GANs by replacing
the Jensen-Shannon divergence with the Wassertein distance.
WGAN-GP [27] is an improved version of WGAN, which
uses gradient penalty instead of the weight clipping to enforce
the Lipschitz constraint. LSGANs [28] used the least squares
loss function instead of the sigmoid cross entropy loss function
for the discriminator, making the training process more stable.
Xiao et al. [11] first introduced the GANs into the problem
of adversarial examples. They proposed AdvGAN to generate
adversarial examples, in both semi-whitebox and black-box at-
tack settings, on several different image classification models.
Perceptual-Sensitive GAN (PS-GAN) [29] focus on attacking
image classification models through generating a adversarial
patch with GAN.
III. METHODOLOGY
In general, UAA-GAN is inspired by the GAN framework,
which in many studies prove effective to mislead image classi-
fication systems and make them return incorrect classification
results. Also inspired by the method of residual learning
[30], we let the generator learn the mapping from the real
images to perturbations, and use a skip connection to add the
perturbations to the real images.
A. Problem Formulation
Given an input image x of size H ×W , the feature maps
(or activations) from a convolutional layer l are denote as χ ∈
Rc×h×w. Let Tθ() be the target image retrieval network with
parameters θ , and F be the feature aggregate function (pooling
function), we denote f as the global deep feature of x, and
fx = F (Tθ(x)). The similarity of two image (xi and xj) is
measured by calculating the distance between the deep features
of the two images via a metric function d(fxi , fxj ).
We use δ to represent the perturbation generated by gen-
erator G and x˜ represents the adversarial example (with
normalized color values), which can be formulated as:
δ = clip(G(x),−, ) (1)
x˜ = clip(x+ δ, 0, 1) (2)
where function clip(input,min,max) is used to limit all
elements in input into the range [min,max]. Here, we use
clip() to restrict the range of both the perturbations and the
adversarial examples.
Deep image retrieval systems improve retrieval performance
by three ways: devising better aggregate functions (e.g., MAC
[14], SPoC [13], RMAC [14], GeM [16]); fine-tuning pre-
trained networks under a more efficient objective function
(e.g. classification loss [17], contrastive loss [16], triplet loss
[31]); using networks architectures that yield more distinctive
features(e.g., attention networks [17]). In all three cases, the
common purpose is to make similar images to have small
distances in the deep features space, and vice versa. A suc-
cessful attack method needs to invalidate such properties while
keeping the adversarial example as real and similar to its
original as possible.
The generated perturbation is expected to push the the query
image away from the original image in the deep feature space.
This can be described the following objective function:
maximize d(fx, fx˜)
s.t. ‖δ‖∞ ≤ , (3)
x˜ ∈ [0, 1]
However, if we only optimize Equation 4, we will obtain an
adversarial example that is visually and significantly different
from the original. This is because Equation 4 only limits the
numeric range of disturbances, not the visual characteristics of
the perturbations. As GANs have achieved remarkable results
in many image generation tasks recently, in this paper, we
employ GANs to generate effective yet subtle perturbations.
B. The Architecture of UAA-GAN
As depicted in Fig. 2, UAA-GAN consists of three com-
ponents. First, a generator that learns to generate effective
yet subtle perturbations and subsequently produce adversarial
query images. Second, a discriminator that distinguishes gen-
erated adversarial examples from real images. Third, a target
network that computes deep feature of any input image.
1) Generator: In UAA-GAN, the generator G is used to
generate query-specific perturbations by mapping the input
query images to the adversarial perturbations manifold. Un-
like Gaussian noise, UAA-GAN-generated perturbations are
expected to be image-specific and unevenly distributed to
achieve maximized disturbance to retrieval results given a fixed
level of noise. UAA-GAN uses conditional GANs [22] as its
generator backbone, which generates fake samples with given
conditions. The dimensions of the perturbation are identical
as the input image, so we can build the generator using the
encoder-decoder CNN architecture. G begins with a stride-
1 convolution block and two stride-2 convolution blocks to
down-sample and encode the input. The convolution block
for the down-sampling process consists of a convolutional
layer, an instance normalization layer and a Rectified Linear
Unit (ReLU) activation. The size of kernels is 3 × 3 and
the numbers of kernels are 8, 16, 32, respectively. Then
we stack four residual blocks with skip-connections [32] to
further encode the features into a latent-space representation.
As show in Figure. 2, the residual blocks is composed of two
stride-1 convolutional layers followed by a batch normalization
layer, and a ReLU activation layer is connected after first
convolutional layer. Each convolutional layer in residual block
contains 32 kernels with size 3 × 3. The skip-connections
in the residual blocks accelerate the convergence process by
elevating the vanishing gradient phenomenon. On the contrary,
the decoder is a combination of two up-sampling blocks and
a stride-1 convolution block. As the deconvolution layer often
creates checkerboard pattern of artifacts and results in blurred
images [33], to obtain more realistic images, we use the resize-
convolution approaches instead of deconvolution layer for up-
sampling. The size of convolution kernels in decoder is 3 ×
3 and the numbers of kernels are 16, 8, 3, respectively. The
latent-space representation is sent to the decoder and we obtain
the final perturbation, which is of the same dimensions as the
input image.
2) Discriminator: The role of the discriminator D is to
determine whether the input image is a generated adversarial
example or a real image. The architecture of D is fairly
straightforward: it consists of three convolution blocks, each
of which is composed of a convolutional layer, a batch
normalization layer, and a Leaky ReLU function. For the
convolutional layers in convolution block, we set the kernel
size to 4 × 4, stride to 2, and the numbers of kernels are 8,
16 and 32, respectively. The last layer of D is a one kernel
convolutional layer followed by a global average pooling layer
and sigmoid function, which generates a 1-dimensional output.
3) Target Network: Regardless of the architecture of the
feature extraction network, most deep feature-based image
retrieval systems represent each image as a fixed-length feature
vector. The similarity between images is measured by a dis-
tance metric function, such as L2 distance or cosine similarity.
For UAA-GAN, details about the target network’s architecture
is insignificant, while the only information required is the
distance metric for image features and the output feature
vectors themselves. The architecture of the network could
remain a black box to UAA-GAN. Therefore UAA-GAN
provides a means of attack with excellent transferability and
generalizability.
C. Loss Function
A well-designed adversarial example has to meet two crite-
rion: effective attack results and minimally-perceptible visual
changes. In order to achieve the above objectives, we inco-
porate three objective functions to jointly guide the learning
process of the UAA-GAN. They are the reconstruction loss,
the GAN Loss and the metric loss.
1) Reconstruction Loss: The reconstruction loss is the
Root-Mean-Squared Error (RMSE) between the output and
the input, which penalizes the generator for introducing dif-
ferences from the input to the output.
We minimize the reconstruction loss to ensure that the
adversarial example is as visually similar as possible to the
original image. The reconstruction loss is formulated as below:
Lrecon = ‖x˜− x‖2 (4)
Here x is the original query image and x˜ is the generated
adversarial example.
2) GAN Loss: To ensure the generated examples look natu-
ral to human, we introduce the GAN loss to train the generator
and discriminator. In UAA-GAN, the goal of the generator is
produce photo-realistic adversarial query images, so that the
discriminator mistakenly considers it as a sample from the
distribution of real images. Meanwhile, the discriminator tries
to classify the input image correctly into real or fake images.
For a better controlled training process, we replace the original
cross entropy loss with the least squares loss [28] and. The
GAN loss functions for the generator and the discriminator
can be defined as follows:
LGAN D = Ex∼pdata(x) [(D(x)− 1)2] + Ex˜∼p(x˜|x) [(D(x˜))2] (5)
LGAN G = Ex˜∼p(x˜|x) [(D(x˜)− 1)2] (6)
where pdata(x) is the distribution of real images and p(x˜|x)
is the conditional distribution of adversarial examples given
x ∼ pdata(x).
3) Metric Loss: In UAA-GAN, the goal of metric loss is
to push the adversarial example away from the original image
and its neighbors in the deep feature space. However, this
simple intuition requires much effort to formulate into feasible
optimziation objectives. A large distance may lead to a steep
increase in reconstruction loss or GAN loss, resulting in low
quality generation results. Conversely, a small distance may
yield unsatisfactory attack results. Therefore, we propose an
adaptive strategy based on triplet loss [34] and online hard
negative mining [35], as illustrated at the bottom right of
Figure 2. Let < x, x˜,x′ > denote a triplet, where x is the
original query image, x˜ is the generated adversarial query
image and x′ is the hardest example (i.e. the real neighbor
of x with the largest distance from x in the batch). We aim
to make the distance between x and x˜ greater than that of x
and x′ by a given margin m. The constraint can be written
as:
d(fx, fx′) +m+ ≤ d(fx, fx˜) (7)
where m is a given scalar, used to control the margin. The
metric loss function is then defined as:
Lmetric = max(d(fx, fx′) +m− d(fx, fx˜), 0) (8)
Finally, the complete loss function used for training the
UAA-GAN is the combination of the three components afore-
mentioned:
LG = LGAN G + λrLrecon + λmLmetric (9)
LD = LGAN D (10)
where λr and λm are the corresponding weights, as hyper-
parameters controlling the relative importance of the three
objectives.
D. Training UAA-GAN
Training UAA-GAN is an iterative process that G and D
perform alternating gradient descent over mini-batches. In the
first step, we sample a batch data from the training set as
input images, and send them to to the fixed G to generate
fake images. Both the real images and fake images are then
sent to D to calculate the GAN loss for D (LGAN D) for the
optimization of D’s parameters. In the next step, we fix the
parameters of D, and send the generated fake images to D to
calculate the GAN loss for G (LGAN D). G is then optimized
by the weighted sum of three losses (i.e., LGAN G, Lrecon and
Lmetric). For each batch, D and G are alternately optimized
in such training process.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Datasets and Evaluation Protocols
We evaluate the proposed UAA-GAN on three tasks: image
retrieval, person ReID and face recognition. Public bench-
mark datasets are used in our experiments: Oxford5K [36]
and Paris6K [37] for image retrieval, Market-1501 [38] and
DukeMTMC-ReID [39] for person ReID and FaceScrub [40]
for face search. The set of evaluation datasets include:
Evaluation Datasets:
• Oxford5K is the Oxford Buildings Dataset, which con-
tains 5062 images collected from Flickr. It offers a set
of 55 queries for 11 landmark buildings, five for each
landmark.
• Paris6K, similar to Oxford5k, contains 6,412 images that
correspond to 12 Paris landmarks with 55 queries.
• Market1501 is consists of 32,688 annotated bounding
boxes of 1,501 individuals. 751 persons’ images are used
for training and 750 persons’ are used for testing.
• DukeMTMC-ReID is constructed from a large-scale
multi-target multi-camera tracking dataset DukeMTMC.
We use 702 persons for training and the remaining 702
persons for testing from DukeMTMC-ReID.
• FaceScrub contains unconstrained 107,818 face image
of 530 celebrities (265 males and 265 females), with
around 200 images per person in average. We split the
530 celebrities into 480 for evaluation and 50 for training.
For the training of UAA-GAN, we used additional datasets
such as retrieval-SfM-30k [41], ILSVRC [42]. All datasets
used for training include:
Training Datasets:
• retrieval-SfM-30k [41] is composed of 30,012 images,
downloaded from Flickr using keywords of landmarks,
and from 162 Structure-from-Motion(SfM) 3D recon-
struction models. When training UAA-GAN, we only use
1,691 query images in retrieval-SfM-30k.
• ILSVRC [42] is the subset of ImageNet containing 1000
categories and 1.2 million images. We randomly selected
2000 images from the validation set of ILSVRC dataset
for training UAA-GAN.
• Market1501 and DukeMTMC-ReID’s training sets are
used for training the attack model for ReID.
• FaceScrub is used for training UAA-GAN for face
search. We randomly selected 1000 face images from
FaceScrub, containing 50 persons from FaceScrub’s train-
ing set with 20 pictures for each person.
Evaluation metrics: Although the image retrieval, person
ReID and face search are similar tasks, the evaluation metrics
of these tasks are slightly different. We follow widely-used
evaluation metrics reported in other research papers, We use
mean Average Precision (mAP) as the evaluation protocol for
image retrieval, mAP and the Cumulative Matching Char-
acteristics (CMC) at rank-1, rank-5 and rank-10 to evaluate
ReID, and CMC at rank-1, rank-5 and rank-10 to evaluate face
search. We evaluate the attack performance of UAA-GAN by
comparing the values of these metrics before and after the
adversarial attacks.
B. Implementation and Parameter Settings
All of our models and experiments are implemented in
PyTorch framework. The experimental server is equipped with
4 NVIDIA TITAN Xp GPUs, 4 Intel Xeon Silver 4110 @
2.10GHz CPUs and 128GB of RAM. The weights of the
convolutional layers are initialized with a normal distribution
with zero mean and standard deviation of 0.02. We use
Adam as the optimization algorithm for discriminator and
generator with the following hyper-parameters: beta1 = 0.9,
beta2 = 0.999, epsilon = 1e−8. The model is trained for 500
epochs and the initial value of the learning rate set to is 0.001
for the generator and 0.004 for the discriminator, in addition
the learning rate decays by an additional 10% of its previous
value at the 150th epoch and 200th epoch respectively. For all
experiments, The  in Equation 1 is set to 0.1, and the margin
m in metric loss is set to 1. The values of batch size, λm, and
λr in Equation 9 is different for the three tasks. We set batch
size to 32, λm = 0.03, and λr = 4 for image retrieval; batch
size to 256, λm = 0.05, and λr = 8 for person ReID; batch
size to 64, λm = 0.01, and λr = 2 for face search.
C. Adversarial Attacks Results
In this subsection we show the evaluation results of UAA-
GAN on three tasks: image retrieval, person-ReID and face
search, respectively.
TABLE I
DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON
IMAGE RETRIEVAL.
Oxford5K Paris6K
Attacked Aggregate Query mAP mAPBase Network Function
VGG16
MAC
Original 0.818 0.788
Gaussian 0.794 0.784
UAA-SfM 0.080 0.169
UAA-ILSVRC 0.044 0.155
RMAC
Original 0.748 0.808
Gaussian 0.725 0.808
UAA-SfM 0.077 0.287
UAA-ILSVRC 0.081 0.201
GeM
Original 0.849 0.860
Gaussian 0.847 0.863
UAA-SfM 0.093 0.177
UAA-ILSVRC 0.112 0.260
ResNet101
MAC
Original 0.769 0.852
Gaussian 0.756 0.860
UAA-SfM 0.182 0.329
UAA-ILSVRC 0.206 0.415
RMAC
Original 0.731 0.841
Gaussian 0.712 0.840
UAA-SfM 0.124 0.352
UAA-ILSVRC 0.137 0.326
GeM
Original 0.862 0.907
Gaussian 0.763 0.865
UAA-SfM 0.137 0.262
UAA-ILSVRC 0.159 0.327
1) Results of Image Retrieval: We evaluate the performance
of UAA-GAN on two target base networks (VGG16 and
ResNet101) with three aggregate functions (MAC, RMAC,
GeM). In total, we performed attacks on six target networks.
All target image retrieval models are fine-tuned on retrieval-
SfM-30k [41], using the publicly released code and pre-trained
models. We trained our UAA-GAN on two datasets, one using
SfM landmark images (similar to Paris6K and Oxford5k)
and the other using more generic images from ImageNet
(ILSVRC). In addition, in order to compare the effectiveness
of the generated perturbations, we use the retrieval results of
query images with added Gaussian noise of the same noise
level as the UAA-GAN generated perturbations. The results
of the attacks are shown in Table I. It is evident that UAA-
GAN resulted in a significant drop in retrieval precision on all
listed retrieval models, suggesting that the attacks are effective
cross datasets and models. For instance, the original mAP for
retrieval are 0.818, 0.748 and 0.849 for MAC, RMAC and
Gem on Oxford5K respectively. The figures drop drastically
to 0.08/0.044, 0.077/0.081 and 0.093 and 0.112 after UAA-
GAN’s attack, showing that the retrieval system is completely
disrupted by the perturbation. Similar results are present on
Paris6K, with the retrieval mAP diminishes by an order of
magnitude. In contrast, the same level of Gaussian noise does
not have a significant impact on the retrieval results. In par-
ticular, UAA-GAN trained on unrelated ILSVRC dataset has
also achieved remarkable results. That is to say, UAA-GAN
can completely disrupt the image retrieval system by training
even on an irrelevant dataset without knowing any domain
Fig. 3. Examples of adversarial attack results of UAA-GAN trained on VGG16 with GeM aggregate function.
knowledge of the target networks. Figure. 3 shows several
examples of adversarial attack results of VGG16 with GeM
aggregate function on both Oxford5K and Paris6K datasets.
We also notice that the generated adversarial query images
show little visual difference from the original query image.
2) Results of Person Re-identification: For person-ReID,
we study two typical network architectures, i.e., fine-tuned
ResNet50 and MGN [18]. Both networks are trained on
DukeMTMC-ReID and Market1501, forming four target net-
works to attack. These target networks are trained by the
public released codes. The attack results are summarized in
Table II. We observe that, on the four target networks, all
the evaluation metrics dropped by a large margin. The mAP
of fine-tuned ResNet50 decreased from 0.722 to 0.010 on
Market1501 and from 0.65 to 0.009 on DukeMTMC-ReID re-
spectively. Meanwhile, the rank-N accuracy has also declined
dramatically. The fact that the same level of Gaussian noise
only slightly reduces the mAP of the target models, by around
0.2, further proves the effectiveness of UAA-GAN. From
empirical results, we confirm that both fine-tuned ResNet50
and MGN are very vulnerable to adversarial query images
generated by UAA-GAN. Compared to fine-tuned ResNet50,
MGN proves more robust to adversarial attacks. Under the
same parameter settings, the mAP of fine-tuned resnet50 is
reduced to less than 0.010, but the mAP MGN model remains
0.116 on Market1501 and 0.045 on DukeMTMC-ReID. MGN
is a part-based methods, which integrates global and local
information with various granularities, which could be the
reason for its robustness to perturbations. Some adversarial
attack results of MGN on Market1501 are presented in Figure.
4.
3) Results of Face Search: For face search, we tested the
attack performance of UAA-GAN on a pre-trained Sphereface
model In Table IV, we list the query performance of
Sphereface on the FaceScrub dataset, and the results after
adversarial attacks. As can be seen from the results, the
evaluation suggests that the face search model’s accuracy has
dropped significantly. Even the Rank-10 accuracy is below 0.5,
which means that we can hardly find the query person from
Fig. 4. Examples of adversarial attack results on Market1501.
the top 10 results. The results demonstrate that the face search
model has almost no defence ability against the adversarial
attacks from UAA-GAN.
D. Further Analysis
1) Transferability: The transferability of CNN networks in
image classification tasks has been studied in many literatures,
it means that the adversarial examples generated for one
model will also mislead other models. We show that in
image retrieval, the transferability of adversarial examples
also widely exists. We evaluate the performance of transfer
attack by cross-evaluating the generated networks trained for
different target networks. Quantitative results are summarized
in Table. III. Experiments reveal that transferability exists
commonly between different aggregate functions within the
same base network structure. For example, the UAA-GAN
trained on VGG-MAC even has a better transfer attack per-
formance on VGG-RMAC and VGG-GeM compared with
its original UAA-GAN. In addition, UAA-GAN also exhibits
transferability crossing different network structures, but the
TABLE II
DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACK ON PERSON RE-IDENTIFICATION.
Market1501 DukeMTMC-ReID
Query mAP top1 top5 top10 mAP top1 top5 top10
ResNet50
Original 0.722 0.895 0.955 0.971 0.650 0.809 0.907 0.934
Gaussian 0.537 0.736 0.855 0.920 0.421 0.662 0.789 0.831
UAA-GAN 0.010 0.007 0.020 0.030 0.009 0.015 0.035 0.052
MGN
Original 0.870 0.945 0.983 0.989 0.874 0.897 0.942 0.953
Gaussian 0.826 0.914 0.968 0.980 0.700 0.822 0.912 0.934
UAA-GAN 0.116 0.129 0.227 0.283 0.045 0.047 0.089 0.114
TABLE III
TRANSFER RESULTS FOR IMAGE RETRIEVAL MODELS. THE FIRST COLUMN REPRESENTS THE TARGET MODEL USED TO TRAIN THE UAA-GAN, AND THE
FIRST ROW INDICATES THE RETRIEVAL PERFORMANCE OF THE ORIGINAL MODEL WITHOUT ATTACK. EACH SUBSEQUENT ROW REPRESENTS THE
RETRIEVAL PERFORMANCE OF THESE SIX SEARCH MODELS AFTER BEING ATTACKED BY UAA-GAN. ALL MODELS ARE EVALUATED ON PARIS6K
DATASET.
Perturbations generated from VGG-MAC VGG-RMAC VGG-GeM ResNet-MAC ResNet-RMAC ResNet-GeM
no attack 0.788 0.808 0.860 0.852 0.841 0.907
VGG-MAC 0.169 0.260 0.158 0.384 0.407 0.324
VGG-RMAC 0.249 0.287 0.204 0.449 0.443 0.395
VGG-GeM 0.174 0.252 0.177 0.399 0.398 0.362
ResNet-MAC 0.515 0.447 0.449 0.329 0.334 0.273
ResNet-RMAC 0.530 0.493 0.484 0.366 0.352 0.299
ResNet-GeM 0.491 0.462 0.430 0.325 0.319 0.262
TABLE IV
DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON FACE
SEARCH.
FaceScrub
Query top1 top5 top10
Sphereface Original 0.713 0.809 0.850UAA-GAN 0.215 0.355 0.424
transferability becomes weaker. For example, the UAA-GAN
trained on ResNet-MAC only leads slight mAP drop on
VGG-based image retrieval model: VGG-MAC(from 0.788 to
0.515), VGG-RMAC (from 0.807 to 0.447), VGG-GeM (from
0.860 to 0.449). Similar phenomena also occur when using
UAA-GAN, which is trained on VGG-based model, to attack
the ResNet-based image retrieval models.
2) Effect of the Discriminator: We further set up an ex-
periment to study the role of the discriminator in the process
of training UAA-GAN. We create a new adversarial attack
network without the discriminator of UAA-GAN, which we
named UAA-G. And, keeping all parameters consistent with
UAA-GAN, we train the UAA-G on SfM dataset and choose
the VGG-GeM as target model. The results show that UAA-
G has similar attack results as UAA-GAN, which achieved
an mAP of 0.091 on oxford5k compared to 0.093 of UAA-
GAN. However, the perturbations generated by UAA-G are
more abrupt than UAA-GAN’s, and it also results in lower
quality of the generated adversarial examples. The details of
the qualitative comparison of the generated perturbations are
shown in Figure. 5. Through the comparison, we can draw
the conclusion that the discriminator will force the generator
to produce more image-realistic and less-distinguishable ad-
versarial examples, by incorporating subtle perturbations in
textured or salient areas of the images, such as key body
parts of human, dominant structural patterns/textures or edges,
rather than in visually insignificant areas.
Fig. 5. Examples of perturbations and adversarial query images generated
by UAA-GAN and UAA-G.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the effect of adversarial ex-
amples for deep feature-based image retrieval. We proposed
UAA-GAN model, which can effectively generate visually
imperceptible adversarial query image to attack the image re-
trieval systems, making them return content irrelevant results.
UAA-GAN is an unsupervised learning algorithm, which only
requires a small amount of unlabeled images for training. Once
trained, it is able to produce query-specific perturbation for any
input image. We conducted extensive experiments on three
tasks and five datasets, illustrating that UAA-GAN is able
to significantly cripple the performance of retrieval systems
without obtrusive changes in the query images. Through visual
comparison, we demonstrate that the discriminator enforces
the UAA-GAN to produce less perceptible perturbations. We
also show that the adversarial examples generated by UAA-
GAN have transferrable attack abilities across different target
models.
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